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DECIDING THE ISSUE OF THE LEGALITY OF 
INDEFINITE DETENTION OF INADMISSIBLE 
ALIENS ONE YEAR AFTER ZADVYDAS V. DAVIS: 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT BROADENS THE RIGHTS 
AFFORDED TO INDIVIDUALS NOT LEGALLY 
ADMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES 
XI V. INS, 298 F.3D 832 
(9TH CIR. 2002) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2001 the Supreme Court decided the issue of the legality of 
indefinite detention of deportable1 aliens in the landmark case of Zadvydas 
v. Davis.2 The court held indefinite government detention3 of deportable 
 
 
 1. “Deportable” aliens are aliens who the government has already admitted to the United States 
and subsequently wishes to remove. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW 
AND POLICY 7 (3d ed. 2002). Established grounds for “deportability” reflect a range of national 
concerns, including economics, health, morality, politics, and national security. Id. See, e.g., United 
States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919, 919 (2d Cir. 1954) (holding that a defendant who pled guilty and was 
convicted of a charge of conspiracy to kidnap was deemed deportable). In addition, separate 
deportability grounds ensure “the integrity of the immigration inspection system itself.” LEGOMSKY, 
supra at 6. (stating that filing a fraudulent application to become a Legal Permanent Resident, or 
“LPR” is grounds for deportation later). The deportability grounds are accompanied by a system of 
statutory provisions that authorize the government to make discretionary waivers of specified 
deportability grounds under certain circumstances. Id. The vast majority of deportable citizens are 
removed through an informal measure known as “voluntary departure.” Id. Nonetheless, the courts 
may hold many formal removal hearings. Id. The INS initiates the proceedings and presents a case 
before an immigration judge. Id. The judge then determines whether the individual is deportable, and 
if so, whether he or she is eligible for some kind of discretionary relief, such as asylum. Id. Once the 
judge renders a decision, the alien or the INS may appeal the decision to the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA). Id. In addition, the alien may also obtain judicial review of the BIA decision by the 
appropriate appellate court in that jurisdiction. Id.  
 2. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). The Supreme Court combined the cases of Zadvydas and Kim Ho Ma, 
both long-time resident aliens of the United States who had been convicted of various crimes. Id. at 
686. The court sentenced Zadvydas to sixteen years in prison for possession of cocaine; however, he 
was released after serving two years. Id. at 684. In 1994 the INS again took him into custody and 
attempted to deport Zadvydas to Germany where he was born. Id. Germany refused to accept 
Zadvydas, as did Lithuania based on lack of citizenship. Id. The Dominican Republic, where his wife 
maintained citizenship, also refused to accept him. Id. The INS kept Zadvydas in detention after the 
expiration of the 90-day statutory removal period. Id. Zadvydas subsequently filed a writ of habeas 
corpus challenging his confinement under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Id. at 684-85. Two years later, a federal 
district court granted the writ, ordering that Zadvydas be released under supervision, holding that the 
detention of Zadvydas when deportation was no longer imminent permanent, unconstitutional 
confinement. Id. at 685. See also Zadvydas v. Caplinger, 986 F. Supp. 1011, 1027-28 (E.D. La. 1997). 
The Fifth Circuit subsequently reversed, finding that the deportation of Zadvydas was not 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p251 Satija book pages.doc  11/19/2003   2:18 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
252   WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 3:251 
 
 
 
 
aliens violated existing immigration law.4 Roughly a year later, in Xi v. 
INS,5 the ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expanded the scope of the 
Supreme Court’s holding to apply to another class of removable aliens: 
those deemed inadmissible.6 Xi is an important milestone in the area of 
immigration law, by broadening the rights accorded to removable aliens.  
 
 
“impossible.” Id. The court found that the government was engaged in good faith efforts to deport 
Zadvydas, and further noted that his detention was periodically subject to review. Id. See also 
Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 291-97 (5th Cir. 1999). For a good overview of the case, see 
Tara Manger, Recent Development, Developments in the Judicial Branch: The Government May Not 
Detain an Alien Indefinitely Because No Other Country is Willing to Accept Him: Zadvydas v. Davis, 
533 U.S. 678 (2001), 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 759, 760 (2001).  
 3. When the INS determines that an alien is present in the United States unlawfully, a final 
order of removal is entered. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2003). The Government will then arrange for the 
alien’s physical removal within the ninety day statutory “removal period.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(1)(A) 
(2002). Under certain circumstances, however, such as a determination that the alien violated criminal 
laws and/or may be a “risk to the community,” the INS may detain an individual beyond the ninety-
day period. See infra note 22 for text of applicable provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2002). The 
Zadvydas holding is directed toward those individuals who remained in detention beyond the 
established statutory period. See Manger, supra note 2, at 760. In Zadvydas, the Court held that such 
detainees could be held in detention only for a reasonable period. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 680, 701. In 
construing the statute, the Court sought to establish a “uniform administration in the federal courts” 
while discerning Congressional intent. Id. The Court established that six months constituted a 
reasonable period of detention, after which period the Government is mandated to consider the 
possibility of release and appropriate conditions. Id. Even after the established six month period has 
expired, however, continued detention of the alien is permissible if the Government can demonstrate 
that his or her removal is reasonably foreseeable. Id. The alien has the burden to provide “good reason 
to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. 
The burden then shifts to the Government to “respond with evidence sufficient to rebut [the detainee’s] 
showing.” Id.  
 4. Id. at 691. 
 5. 298 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 6. “Inadmissible” aliens, (formerly called “excludable” aliens prior to the enactment of the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub.L.No. 104-208, 
110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1251(d)(2-3) (2002)), are individuals seeking admission to 
the United States who fall within one of the criteria for inadmissibility detailed in Section 212(a) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Pub.L. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (June 27, 1952). Aliens fitting 
into one or more of the classes listed in this section are “ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be 
admitted to the United States.” INA § 212(a). Under the new regulations implemented by IIRIRA, an 
alien may be deemed inadmissible under any one of ten grounds. These grounds include: health-related 
grounds; criminal and related grounds; security and related grounds; public charge proscription; labor 
certification requirements and qualifications for certain immigrants; illegal entrants and immigration 
violators proscription; documentation requirements; ineligibility for citizenship; aliens unlawfully 
present; and miscellaneous. IIRIRA served to broaden the grounds for inadmissibility. See, e.g., 
Abourezk v. Reagan 785 F.2d 1058, 1059, 1043, 1058, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding government’s 
decision that an anarchist or a Communist party member is inadmissible must be based on projected 
engagement in activities prejudicial to the public interest, and such perception must be independent of 
the fact that the individual is a member of the organization). Under the new regulations, bar new 
categories of immigrants, including immigrants who cannot document that they have been vaccination 
against vaccine-preventable diseases and former U.S. citizens who renounced citizenship to avoid 
taxation. See DAVID WEISSBRODT, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL § 9-1 (4th ed. 
1998).  
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This Recent Development analyzes Xi by examining the Ninth 
Circuit’s majority and dissenting opinions and addressing the legal and 
policy implications of this case. Section II details the facts and procedural 
history of Xi. Section III(a) provides a comprehensive analysis of the 
statute addressing the detention and removal of aliens ordered removed 
and the landmark Supreme Court case of Zadvydas v. Davis, which 
provided the basis for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Xi. Section III(b) 
discusses the majority’s holding in Xi. Section III(c) addresses the 
dissent’s legal arguments. Section III(d) addresses the foreign policy 
concerns which the dissent raises. Section IV offers a legal analysis of the 
implications of Xi in construing the USA PATRIOT Act. Finally, Section 
V provides an analysis of the likely international impact of Xi.  
In Section VI this Recent Development concludes that due to the 
careful construction of court’s opinion, which provides for continued 
detention in cases involving national emergency, a legal challenge to the 
provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act is not likely to succeed. This Recent 
Development also concludes that should the Ninth Circuit’s holding be 
upheld by the Supreme Court, it will significantly impair the government’s 
ability to restrict immigration and may have a deleterious effect upon the 
strength of our nation’s foreign policy. In addition, this Recent 
Development asserts that future decisions may follow the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding in Xi and broaden the rights afforded to inadmissible aliens.  
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Lin Guo Xi, a Chinese national, fled his homeland for the Northern 
Mariana Islands in June, 1997.7 The United States Coast Guard thwarted 
Lin’s plans for escape, when it arrested Lin off the coast of Guam after 
discovering him aboard a boat that was being used to smuggle aliens in 
violation of United States immigration laws. Lin pleaded guilty to the 
charge of smuggling, and was subsequently convicted.8 After completing a 
six-month prison sentence, INS detained Lin pending the outcome of 
removal proceedings.9  
Once within United States borders, Lin applied for asylum based on his 
opposition to China’s family planning laws.10 An immigration judge found 
 
 
 7. Xi, 298 F.3d at 832. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. The Chinese government discourages couples from having more than one child by 
imposing a hefty economic penalty couples with larger families. See Yong Hao Chen v. INS, 195 F.3d 
198, 200-04 (4th Cir. 1999). In addition, forced sterilizations and abortions have been reported in the 
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Lin’s argument unpersuasive, denied Lin’s claim, and issued a removal 
order.11 It is disputed as to the number of times that the INS attempted to 
secure travel documents for Lin’s return to China and the number of times 
he refused to cooperate. It is indisputable, however, that in February 2001, 
Lin finally agreed to cooperate with the INS in obtaining the proper travel 
documents.12  
Upon initial review of Lin’s detention status in February 2001, the INS 
learned that Xi had a place to stay and employment prospects in 
Washington State.13 Nevertheless, the reviewing officer decided to keep 
Lin in detention. Lin filed a habeas corpus petition14 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241.15 Ten days before the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas v. 
Davis,16 holding that indefinite detention of deportable aliens was illegal, 
the district court denied Lin’s petition.17 In light of Zadvydas, Lin filed a 
motion for reconsideration.18 The district court denied the motion for 
reconsideration,19 relying upon the entry fiction doctrine because Lin was 
 
 
rural areas of that country. Id. at 201. Over the years, some Chinese nationals have argued successfully 
that the Chinese family planning laws constitute persecuted them; the government granted the affected 
individuals asylum. Under INA § 101(a)(42), any forced abortion or sterilization, or persecution for 
failure or refusal to submit to abortion or sterilization, constitutes persecution on account of political 
opinion. Recent case law addressing the INA provision has established that the alien must demonstrate 
that such fear is well founded. See id. at 200-04 (noting that the State Department had asserted that 
forced sterilizations and abortions had become less frequent in China, that they occur mainly in rural 
areas, and that they are especially unlikely to affect people (like the couple seeking asylum) who bear 
children while attending school in the United States and then return home). As a result, the court held 
that the burden is on the applicant to provide evidence that the State Department is wrong or that he or 
she has a particular reason to fear coerced sterilization or abortion. Id. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 1, at 
892-93.  
 11. Xi, 298 F.3d at 833.  
 12. Id. At the time the 9th Circuit issued this opinion, a request for travel documents had been 
submitted to the Chinese consulate, which had not yet responded. Id. The United States government 
asserted that the Chinese government accepts the return of its nationals who have been ordered 
removed from the United States; Lin maintained that the Chinese government did not accept the 
returnees. Id.  
 13. Id. 
 14. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, habeas corpus is defined as follows:  
A writ employed to bring a person before a court, most frequently to ensure that the party’s 
imprisonment or detention is not illegal. . . In addition to being used to test the legality of an arrest 
or commitment, the writ may be used to obtain review of (1) the regularity of extradition process, 
(2) the right to or amount of bail, or (3) the jurisdiction of a court that has imposed a criminal 
sentence.  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 569 (7th ed. 2000).  
 15. Xi, 298 F.3d at 833. Lin filed his habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
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never lawfully admitted to the United States.”20 In essence, the court 
reasoned that although Lin was technically living within United States 
borders as an inadmissible alien he was not entitled to the same rights and 
privileges accorded to aliens living here legally. At the time of the 
appellate review, Lin remained in detention.21
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Indefinite Detention of Deportable Aliens 
In holding that indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens is illegal, the 
Xi court focused primarily on the federal statute that provides the 
groundwork for the detention and removal of aliens ordered removed, 8 
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).22  
The court attached significant weight to the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of Section 1231 as applied to deportable aliens in Zadvydas 
 
 
 20. In Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953), the Court held that 
“an alien on the threshold of initial entry stands on a different footing” with regard to due process 
rights. Id. at 206, 212. According to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in Xi v. INS, 298 F.3d at 834,  
In Mezei the Court created an ‘entry fiction’ which extended this distinction to some individuals 
within the United States but who, as a result of their status, are deemed technically to be outside. 
Under an earlier version of the INA, we interpreted this fiction to authorize the courts to treat an 
alien in exclusion proceedings as one standing on the threshold of entry, and therefore not entitled 
to the constitutional protections provided to those within the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States. 
Xi, 298 F.3d at 834. 
 21. Id. The INS relied upon 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) for authority to detain Lin. Id. See infra note 
22 for the full text of this provision. 
 22. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2002). The applicable statute, entitled Inadmissible or criminal aliens, 
reads as follows:  
An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under section 212 [8 U.S.C.A. § 1182], removable 
under section 237(a)(1)(C) . . . [8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(4)] . . . or who has been determined by the 
Attorney General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, 
may be detained beyond the removal period and, if released, shall be subject to the terms of 
supervision in paragraph (3). 
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). 
 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) (2002), to which this statute refers, is entitled Supervision after 90-day 
period. The text of paragraph (3) of § 1231(a) reads as follows: 
If the alien does not leave or is not removed within the removal period, the alien, pending 
removal, shall be subject to supervision under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General. The 
regulations shall include provisions requiring the alien-to appear before an immigration officer 
periodically for identification; to submit, if necessary, to a medical and psychiatric examination at 
the expense of the United States Government; to give information under oath about the alien’s 
nationality, circumstances, habits, associations, and activities, and other information the Attorney 
General considers appropriate; and to obey reasonable written restrictions on the alien’s conduct 
or activities that the Attorney General prescribes for the alien. 
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) (2002). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p251 Satija book pages.doc  11/19/2003   2:18 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
256   WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 3:251 
 
 
 
 
v. Davis.23 In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court focused on the provisions in 
Section 123124 which permitted the detention of deportable aliens beyond 
the ninety day statutory “removal period”25 if they have violated criminal 
laws or have “been determined . . . to be a risk to the community.”26  
Zadvydas, was held deportable after being convicted of several 
crimes,27 and held beyond the 90-day statutory period after the INS 
encountered difficulty in successfully deporting him.28 In its defense, the 
INS asserted that the Attorney General had the discretion to determine the 
length of Zadvydas’ detention.29 The Supreme Court held that federal 
habeas corpus law30 vests jurisdiction over such matters exclusively within 
the federal court system.31 The Court found no indication that the 
legislature intended for the Attorney General to retain exclusive control 
over such matters.32
Zadvydas held that the United States Constitution does not allow for 
indefinite detention of aliens when deportation is “no longer reasonably 
foreseeable.”33 In support of its holding, the Court noted that the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause34 applies equally to all persons within 
the United States, regardless of “lawful, unlawful, temporary, or 
 
 
 23. Xi, 298 F.3d at 835-39. 
 24. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2002).  
 25. See supra notes 3 and 22. 
 26. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). 
 27. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684. The court convicted Zadvydas of several crimes, including 
possession, with intent to distribute, of cocaine, theft, and attempted burglary. After his most recent 
conviction, the court sentenced Zadvydas to 16 years’ imprisonment; he was paroled after two years. 
The INS took him into custody after his release. Id.  
 28. See supra note 2. 
 29. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 687-89. 
 30. Id. The primary habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C § 2241, allows any person to claim in federal 
court that he or she is being held “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United 
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 
 31. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 687. The Court noted that the primary habeas corpus statute confers 
jurisdiction upon federal courts to hear those types of cases. See supra note 1. In finding that habeas 
corpus cases even in immigration matters, remained the domain of federal courts, the court chronicled 
the history of judicial review of challenges to deportation orders. Id. at 687.  
 32. Id. at 687-88. The Court reviewed several recently enacted statutes which limited the 
circumstances in which judicial review of deportation decisions is available, but decided that none of 
those provisions were applicable in Zadvydas’s circumstances. Most significantly, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(B)(ii) (1994), provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review” decisions “specified 
. . . to be in the discretion of the Attorney General.” Id. at 688. The Court determined that Zadvydas 
did not request a review of the Attorney General’s exercise of discretion; but instead challenged the 
Attorney General’s authority under the post-removal-period statute. Id. The Court maintained that the 
scope of authority of the Attorney General was not a matter of the Attorney General’s discretion. Id. 
 33. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699. 
 34. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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permanent status.”35 The deportation statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1231, also states 
that detention is limited to “a period reasonably necessary to bring about 
that alien’s removal from the United States.”36
With respect to the “reasonable time” limitation, the Court determined 
that detention in excess of six months was constitutionally objectionable.37 
In arriving at this figure, the Court reviewed the legislative history from 
the time of the creation of the statute.38 According to the Court, the legally 
correct course of action to the expiration of the “reasonable time” period 
of detention is to first determine if the alien can provide “good reason to 
believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably 
foreseeable future.”39 The government bears the burden of rebutting the 
alien’s showing with sufficient evidence to the contrary.40 If it is 
determined that the alien’s deportation is not reasonably foreseeable,41 the 
government must release the detainee subject to strict conditions rather 
than fully discharging the detainee into the community.42 Underscoring 
this point, the Court noted that “the choice . . . is not between 
imprisonment and the alien detainee ‘living at large. . . . It is between 
imprisonment and supervision under release conditions that may not be 
violated.”43
Even if a court determines that deportation is in fact foreseeable, 
certain factors, such as the alien’s potential danger to the community at 
large,44 may still warrant that individual’s continued detention beyond the 
 
 
 35. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. 
 36. Id. at 701. See supra note 22, for the full text of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). 
 37. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.  
 38. Id. The Court reasoned that in this case it had to discern Congressional intent and determine a 
presumptively reasonable detention period. Id. at 696-97. To that end, the Court looked to legislative 
history surrounding the inception of the statute. Id. at 696-702. In the 1996 immigration laws 
(IIRIRA), Congress shortened the removal period to ninety days. Id. at 701. The Court found it 
difficult to believe that Congress thought all removals could be accomplished within that amount of 
time. Id. However, some evidence also suggested that prior to the enactment of the statute, Congress 
had doubted the constitutionality of detention in excess of six months. Id. (citing Juris. Statement of 
United States in United States v. Witkovich, O.T. 1956, No. 295, pp.8-9). 
 39. Id. at 701.
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 699. 
 42. Id. See supra note 25 and accompanying text for a description of possible restrictions on an 
alien released pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).  
 43. Id. at 696. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1253, there are penalties for failure to comply with release 
conditions. 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (2002). 
 44. Id. at 700. Penalties may be imposed for violations of conditions of release. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(a)(3). 
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six months “reasonable time” limitation.45 Absent these factors, however, 
continued detention is an unconstitutional due process violation.46  
B. Xi Majority: Inadmissible Aliens Fall Under the Standard Articulated 
in Zadvydas 
In Xi v. INS,47 The Ninth Circuit chose to extend the reach of Zadvydas 
to inadmissible aliens.48 The majority held that although the United States 
never legally admitted Lin nonetheless fell “squarely within the ambit of 8 
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) and, consequently, within the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Zadvydas.”49  
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the statute did not distinguish among 
the various classes of aliens.50 Thus, the court held that inadmissible aliens 
would be summarily treated as deportable aliens for purposes of 
interpreting the statute.51 According to the Ninth Circuit, Zadvydas applied 
equally to both classes of aliens.52
Despite arguments raised by the dissent’s argument that deportable 
aliens are generally afforded higher status than inadmissible aliens in the 
eyes of the law, the majority reasoned that the Supreme Court’s 
categorical interpretation of the statute in Zadvydas gave them little choice 
but to apply the holding to Xi.53 According to the majority, the statute’s 
 
 
 45. Id. at 690-91. The Court maintained that preventive detention to protect the community was 
only justified in cases of extreme dangerousness, subject to strong procedural protections. For 
guidance, the Court looked to two cases. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), upheld 
preventative pretrial detention, stressing “stringent time limitations,” limited application to “the most 
serious of crimes” subject to proof of dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence, and the 
presence of judicial safeguards). Id. at 747, 750. In Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992) the court 
struck down insanity-related detention system that required the detainee to prove nondangerousness. 
Id. at 81-83. 
 46. Id.  
 47. 298 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 48. Id. at 836. The Zadvydas majority stated that, “In our view, the statute, read in light of the 
Constitution’s demands, limits an alien’s post-removal period detention to a period reasonably 
necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States. It does not permit indefinite 
detention.” Id. (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689). 
 49. Id. at 833-34. In Zadvydas, the Court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) did not permit the 
indefinite detention of two long-time resident aliens when the court ordered removed to countries that 
would not accept them following the commission of crimes. Id. (construing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 
684-86). See also supra notes 22-45 and accompanying text. 
 50. Id. at 835. 
 51. Id. at 836. The court noted that “[t]he clear text of the statute, coupled with the Supreme 
Court’s categorical interpretation, leaves us little choice but to conclude that Zadvydas applies to 
inadmissible individuals like Lin.” Id. at 836. 
 52. Id. The court stated that “The statute, on its face, makes no exceptions for inadmissible 
aliens.” Id.  
 53. Id. 
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language did not provide for a bifurcated construction, affording different 
rights to different categories of aliens.54  
C. Dissent: Zadvydas is Inapplicable in Cases Involving Inadmissible 
Aliens 
In her dissenting opinion, Judge Pamela Ann Rymer articulated her 
belief that the in the majority improperly applied the Zadvydas holding in 
Xi.55 Judge Rymer’s chief argument was that the Court’s interpretation of 
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)56 in Zadvydas applied only to aliens deemed 
deportable.57 Lin Guo Xi was classified as an inadmissible alien as 
opposed to a deportable alien.58  
Judge Rymer relied upon language in the Zadvydas opinion indicating 
that indefinite detention of deportable aliens was unlawfully violated the 
Due Process Clause, which applies “to all persons ‘within the United 
States’ regardless of lawful presence.”59 Rymer asserted that since 
inadmissible aliens like Lin did not reside within the borders of the United 
States, they were not entitled to the same constitutional protection as 
 
 
 54. Id. at 836-37. The court looked to the language of Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Zadvydas. 
Justice Kennedy noted that bifurcated construction was untenable. He stated that: “the majority’s logic 
might be that inadmissible aliens can be treated differently. Yet it is not a plausible construction of 
§ 1231(a)(6) to imply a time limit as to one class [deportable aliens] but not to another [inadmissible 
aliens] The text does not admit this possibility.” Id. at 836 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 710 
(Kennedy, J. dissenting).  
 55. See 298 F.3d at 840-43. 
 56. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(6) (2002). See supra note 22, for the full text of this provision. 
 57. 298 F.3d at 840-43. 
 58. Id. at 835. “Deportable” aliens are noncitizens who have been admitted to the United States, 
but whom the government wishes to remove for any number of concerns, including national security 
or fraud in the initial application for admission. See supra note 1. ”Inadmissible” aliens, on the other 
hand, are noncitizens who are seeking to be admitted to the United States and fall under one of the 
statutory grounds for inadmissibility, such as a history of past criminal conduct or potential to become 
a public charge. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 59. 298 F.3d at 841 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693). Essentially, the Court held that those 
individuals residing within United States borders, both citizens and LPR’s, are allotted certain rights 
under the constitution. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning and 
Impact of Zadvydas v. Davis. 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365 (2002). Regarding deportable aliens and 
constitutional rights, Aleinikoff summarized Justice Breyer’s opinion as follows: 
“Justice Breyer’s answer appears to be that because the non-citizen detainees had entered the 
United States, they benefit from the usual panoply of constitutional rights granted to citizens and 
non-citizens alike, including the right to be free from arbitrary detention. Thus, immigrant status 
alone cannot provide the ‘something more’ necessary to justify indefinite detention . . . [T]o be 
sure, non-citizens inside the United States are afforded most of the constitutional protections that 
citizens enjoy.”  
Id. at 370.  
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aliens living within the United States.60  
Rymer pointed to the Supreme Court’s holding in Shaughnessy v. 
Mezei61 that the U.S. government may detain an excludable alien 
indefinitely if his country origin refuses to re-accept him.62 The Zadvydas 
majority held that Mezei did not apply in the case of admitted aliens due to 
constitutional concerns about aliens residing within the borders of the 
United States.63 Rymer asserted that, in light of Zadvydas, while indefinite 
detention of aliens already admitted to the United States and later deemed 
deportable was in fact not permissible, aliens who had not yet been 
admitted remained unaffected by the Supreme Court decision.64
In bolstering her argument, Judge Rymer quoted language from 
Zadvydas that suggested the Court intended to limit the holding to 
deportable aliens.65 According to the Court, inadmissible aliens “present a 
very different question” and being inadmissible “made all the 
difference.”66 According to Rymer, the Court construed the statute in a 
manner that guaranteed Due Process to deportable aliens in an effort to 
ensure that the statute would not be rendered “categorically infirm.”67 In 
Rymer’s opinion, the Zadvydas Court issued a narrow holding in order to 
protect the rights of aliens already admitted to the United States.68  
In addition, Judge Rymer asserted that existing caselaw directly 
contradicted the majority’s holding. For example, Rhymer referred to 
Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison,69 in which the Ninth Circuit held that 
excludable aliens who could not be returned to their country of origin 
could be detained at the discretion of the Attorney General.70
 
 
 60. 298 F.3d at 840-43. 
 61. 345 U.S. 206 (1953). See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 62. Xi, 298 F.3d at 841.  
 63. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. According to the Court, “once an alien enters the country, the 
legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the United 
States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Id. 
 64. Xi, 298 F.3d at 840.  
 65. Id. According to Rymer:  
The Court’s interpretation was discrete to admitted aliens. It was driven by the need to avoid 
constitutional problems that pertain to those who are admitted—but that do not pertain to those 
who are not admitted. By invoking the constitutional avoidance doctrine, the Court was trying to 
effectuate legislative intent yet assure constitutional application to admitted aliens.  
Id. at 841. 
 66. Id. (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693). 
 67. Id. According to Rymer, “When a statute has different applications, it is not necessary to say 
that it is categorically infirm; it is only the constitutionally problematic aspects which are subject to the 
construction that avoids the problem.” Id.  
 68. Id. at 693. 
 69. 44 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc).  
 70. Xi, 298 F.3d at 842-43. See also 44 F.3d at 1448. The court held that:  
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The majority discounted Barrera-Echavarria, maintaining that its 
holding was no longer viable in light of the implementation of the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA),71 which 
changed the wording of the statute’s language and renamed “excludable” 
aliens as “inadmissible” aliens.72 The statute replaced the term “entry” 
with the term “admission,”73 redefined as “the lawful entry of [an] alien 
into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration 
officer.”74  
In defense of her argument, Rymer asserted that while the Barrera-
Echaveria’s statutory analysis may not be relevant given the changes 
implanted by IIRIRA, the rationale behind its holding was still valid.75 In 
fact, although IIRIRA altered the statutory language, IIRIRA effectively 
tightened, rather than loosened, the removal procedures.76 In 
distinguishing Mezei in the Zadvydas opinion, the Supreme Court 
reasoned that Mezei’s excludable status “made all the difference.”77 In 
essence, the Supreme Court disregarded its holding in Mezei because 
Zadvydas was an alien who was already residing in the United States and 
had not been admitted. In this regard, Rymer asserts that the Supreme 
Court disallowed indefinite detention of Zadvydas precisely because he 
was deportable, not inadmissible (or excludable).78 Under that analysis, 
Lin’s status as an inadmissible alien should have placed him squarely 
outside of the scope of the Court’s holding in Zadvydas.79  
 
 
Reading a time limit on detention into § 1227 [which provided for immediate deportation of 
excludable aliens unless the Attorney General concludes that it is not practicable or proper] would 
risk frustrating the government’s ability to control immigration policy and relations with foreign 
nations. A judicial decision requiring that excludable aliens be released into American society 
when neither their countries of origin nor any third country will admit them might encourage the 
sort of instransigence Cuba has exhibited in negotiations over the Mariel refugees.  
Id. See infra note 89, for a description of the Mariel boatlift referenced by Judge Rymer. 
 71. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996(IIRIRA), supra note 
6.  
 72. See supra note 6. Compare 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(13), 1182 (1994) with 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1101(a)(13)(A), 1182 (2002). 
 73. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(B)(A), 1182 (2002). 
 74. Id. 
 75. See Xi, 298 F.3d at 842-43. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 78. Xi, 298 F.3d at 841. 
 79. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
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D. Dissent: Policy Criticism of the Majority’s Holding and Potential 
Repercussions of Xi v. INS 
In her dissenting opinion, Judge Rymer maintained that the majority’s 
holding would prove to have a deleterious effect upon the government’s 
ability to control immigration policy and foreign relations.80 Practically 
speaking, the majority’s holding, according to Rymer, would leave an 
“unprotected spot in the Nation’s armor,”81 reducing the power of the 
Attorney General and allowing individuals who should never have gained 
admission to the United States to be released into society. 
In particular, Rymer asserted that a policy permitting the eventual 
release of inadmissible aliens into American society would encourage 
leaders of countries such as Cuba to compel the United States to grant 
physical admission via parole to any individuals those countries wished by 
simply sending them to the United States and then refusing to take them 
back.82 In cases with sensitive foreign policy implications, such as those 
relating to Cuba, such a result would be contrary to the U.S. interests. 
IV. THE LEGACY OF XI V. INS: INDEFINITE DETENTION OF INADMISSIBLE 
ALIENS AND THE USA PATRIOT ACT83
Xi marks an extremely important development in immigration law, by 
extending the holding of Zadvydas to a class of noncitizens previously 
unprotected under the constitution.  
Should Xi be upheld by the Supreme Court, such a decision will likely 
provide further ammunition for challengers of the newly enacted USA 
PATRIOT Act.84 The well publicized provisions of the Act provide the 
Attorney General authority to essentially do the very thing disallowed 
under both this case and Zadvydas: detain aliens suspected of terrorist 
 
 
 80. Xi, 298 F.3d at 841.  
 81. Id. (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695-96). 
 82. Id. (quoting Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 975 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc), aff’d, 472 U.S. 846 
(1985)). In Nelson the Eleventh Circuit held that “[T]his approach would ultimately result in our 
losing control of our borders. A foreign leader could eventually compel us to grant physical admission 
via parole to any aliens he wished by the simple expedient of sending them here and then refusing to 
take them back.” Id.  
 83. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 
272 (codified in scattered Titles of the U.S.C.). See also Jonathan Krim & Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Bush 
Signs into Law New Enforcement Era; U.S. Gets Broad Electronic Powers, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 
2001, at A6. 
 84. See infra note 92. 
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activity free from the legal constraints of the Due Process Clause.85 In light 
of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the legislature has seen fit to 
enact a statute that allows the government to detain foreign nationals 
suspected of engaging in terrorist activity more easily.86 Among those 
arrested since the enactment of the statute include aliens already residing 
in the United States as well as those who have not successfully gained 
legal entry.87  
On the surface, it seems clear that the Zadvydas decision, which pre-
dated the PATRIOT Act by several months, could provide a strong basis 
for the argument that indefinite detention of deportable aliens for any 
reason is illegal. However, Justice Breyer’s opinion contains an important 
caveat: “special arguments might be made for forms of preventive 
detention” in situations involving national security or “other special 
circumstances.”88 Thus, Zadvydas does not affect the Attorney General’s 
power to protect national security. It is generally accepted that the very 
real possibility of further terrorist attacks constitutes the situation 
involving “national security” suggested in Zadvydas. In an April 17, 2003 
Department of Justice opinion requested by the new Homeland Security 
Department Attorney General John Ashcroft recently re-asserted the right 
of the Government to indefinitely detain illegal immigrants whose cases 
pose national security concerns in wake of the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks.89  
 
 
 85. For information about the history of the Due Process Clause and modern arguments 
concerning its substantive aspects, see GERALD GUNTER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 432-54 (13th ed. 1997). The Fifth Amendment provides that “No person shall 
. . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. The 
clause has ancient origins in Anglo-American law, which protected free men from government acts 
unless in accord with the “law of the land.” GUNTER & SULLIVAN, supra, at 433. Historically 
Americans have treated this guarantee as both procedural and substantive, although its substantive 
aspects are among the most controversial issues in constitutional law. Id. at 432-33. 
 86. See Regina Germain, Rushing to Judgment: The Unintended Consequences of the USA 
PATRIOT Act for Bona Fide Refugees, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 505 (2002). According to Germain, the 
new legislation “specifically allows for the Attorney General to continue to detain a non-citizen 
‘irrespective of… any relief from removal granted that alien.” It is, therefore, not only conceivable, but 
quite possible that individuals granted asylum could be detained indefinitely if the provisions of this 
new section are applied.” Id. at 524. 
 87. Such individuals included those who engaged in terrorist activity, and the threat, attempt, or 
conspiracy activities. In addition, the Act applied to members of foreign terrorist organizations. Id. at 
518. A complete analysis of the USA PATRIOT Act is beyond the scope of this article. For a good 
overview, see Jonathan Lancaster, House Approves Terrorism Measure; Bill Grants Bulk of Bush’s 
Request, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2001, at A1.  
 88. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696. 
 89. See In re D-J-, 23 I&N Dec. 572 (A.G. 2003 (2003 WL 1953603)). In an administrative 
opinion regarding the case of a Hatian asylum-seeker, Attorney General John Ashcroft concluded that 
aliens may not be released on bond while their cases are being decided by immigration judges if the 
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Challenges to the legislation utilizing Zadvydas have been generally 
unsuccessful.90 This is in large part due to the fact that Congress actually 
partially adopted Zadvydas’s holding in the PATRIOT Act; the Act 
requires the government to release certain removable aliens after six 
months.91 As implied in Zadvydas, the Attorney General may deny such 
relief if the alien is found to be a danger to the community or to any 
person.92 The post-Zadvydas Act, therefore, returns some discretion to the 
Attorney General.93 This discretion is limited, however, to a narrow class 
of aliens with some connection to national security or terrorism concerns.94 
While Congress certainly indicated support for reasonableness limitations 
and for the six-month presumptively reasonable period,95 Congress also 
stressed its concern for community safety in implementing this 
legislation.96
The Ninth Circuit carefully avoided the PATRIOT Act issue in Xi, 
noting that the court wished to “express no view on the legislation but note 
 
 
Government can show that national security issues are implicated. Id. at 572. The Attorney General 
issued the opinion upon request from the Homeland Security Department after the Board of 
Immigration Appeals upheld a judge’s decision to release Hatian asylum-seeker David Joseph on a 
$2,500 bond. Id. at 573. The Government asserted that the release of Hatian refugees on bond could 
compromise national security if the release triggered a huge wave of immigrants to attempt to reach 
U.S. shores. Id. at 577. According to the Government, could potentially divert the efforts of 
governmental agencies that are busy trying to thwart terror attacks. Id. In his administrative opinion, 
Attorney General John Ashcroft reasserted the Attorney General’s “broad discretion” in determining 
the status of potential immigrants. Id. at 572.  
 90. See Padilla ex rel. v. Bush, 233 F.Supp.2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). This case involved an LPR 
alleged to be a combatant associated with the al Quaeda terrorist network. The court noted the 
Zadvydas, Court “was careful to point out that the case did not involve ‘terrorism or other special 
circumstances where special arguments might be made for forms of preventive detention and for 
heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of national 
security.’” Id. at 591 (construing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696). 
 91. USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 83, § 412 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). 
 92. See Antiterrorism Legislation Gains Momentum in Both Chambers; Lawmakers Offer 
Assorted Stand-Alone Bills, 78 No. 39 Interrel Releases 1591, 1592-93 (Oct. 8, 2001) (explaining that 
the provision comports with the presumptive period, but allows the Attorney General to consider 
whether an alien is dangerous to the community or any individual).  
 93. USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 83, § 412 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). 
 94. Id. at 1226A(a)(3) (listing the classes of aliens affected by the Act). See also Rob Reckers, 
Note, The Future of Aliens Ordered Removed from the United States in the Wake of Zadvydas v. 
Davis, 25 HOUST. J. INT’L 195, 228 n. 256, 257. According to Recker:  
In the USA PATRIOT Act, Congress showed some approval for Zadvydas’s presumptively 
reasonable detention period, but seemed to reject the Court’s prohibition of extended detention of 
aliens who pose a danger to the community. Nevertheless, Congress has yet to directly respond to 
Zadvydas, and the lasting impact of this case upon U.S. immigration law remains to be seen. 
Id.  
 95. See Antiterrorism Legislation Gains Momentum in Both Chambers; Lawmakers Offer 
Assorted Stand-Alone Bills, 78 No. 39 Interpretter Releases 1591, 1593 (Oct. 8, 2001). 
 96. USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 83, § 412 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). 
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it simply to underscore the scope of our holding.”97 The implication seems 
to be that the “national security” exception carved out in Zadvydas still 
holds. A challenge to the legality of detaining individuals under the Act in 
Xi would likely follow the path of similar challenges under Zadvydas.98 It 
is certainly significant, however, that individuals who have never been 
legally admitted to the United States could potentially have more 
constitutional rights than individuals who have been residing here as legal 
permanent residents (LPR’s) for a great many years. 
V. THE GLOBAL IMPACT OF XI V. INS 
One of the long-term effects of the Ninth Circuit’s holding, should the 
Supreme Court uphold it, is the potential increase in attempts at entry by 
individuals from countries where legal immigration is often difficult and 
ties with the U.S. are strained, such as Cuba.99 As suggested by Judge 
Rymer in her dissenting opinion in Xi, a policy allowing for the release of 
inadmissible aliens into American society would only encourage foreign 
leaders to rid themselves of certain “undesirable” individuals, such as 
criminals, by allowing them to travel to the United States without 
documentation and then refusing to re-admit them.100 Such a policy will 
likely put further strain on the United States’ relations with such countries.  
Some may argue that the Ninth Circuit’s holding will pose a threat to 
national security, allowing “rogue” nations to send terrorists to the United 
States and then to refuse to take them back, effectively allowing them to 
 
 
 97. Xi, 298 F.3d at 839. 
 98. See analysis of Padilla v. Bush, supra note 90. The District Court found the petitioner’s 
argument for limited detention under Zadvydas unpersuasive, determining provisions of the PATRIOT 
Act, as well as the holding in Zadvydas, allowed for continued detention of individuals involved in 
“terrorism or other special circumstances.” Padilla, 233 F. Supp.2d at 591 (construing Zadvydas, 533 
U.S. at 696).  
 99. Xi, 298 F.3d at 841. Precisely such a situation has occurred in the past. In early April 1990, 
approximately 10,800 Cuban citizens sought sanctuary in the Peruvian embassy in Havana as political 
refugees. United States v. Frade, 709 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1983). See also Alonso-Martinez v. 
Meissner, 697 F.2d 1160, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1983). About 25,000 of the arriving aliens confessed to 
some kind of criminal history in Cuba, and immigration officials deemed roughly 2,000 refugees’ 
backgrounds serious enough to warrant continued detention. Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100, 101 
(4th Cir. 1982). Under the discretion accorded to him under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), the Attorney 
General paroled approximately 122,000 Cuban refugees into the United States. Id. Although these 
refugees technically lived within the United States, they were considered excludable (pre-IIRIRA term 
for inadmissible) due to their illegal entry and thus subject to deportation. Id. Cuba, however, initially 
refused to accept their return. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576, 578 (11th Cir. 1984). In 1984 
Cuba eventually agreed to the return of roughly 3,000 of the aptly named “Marielitos” in 1984. See 
Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 469 U.S. 1311, 1312 (1985). Many remain in INS custody. Id. 
 100. Id.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p251 Satija book pages.doc  11/19/2003   2:18 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
266   WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 3:251 
 
 
 
 
infiltrate our borders. However, cases subsequent to Zadvydas, suggest 
that individuals suspected of engaging in terrorist activity could still be 
detained indefinitely, due to the “national security” exception to the 
Zadvydas.101  
VI. CONCLUSION  
As addressed in Sections IV and V, it appears that the Xi decision is 
likely to provide further guidance for judicial interpretation of the 
PATRIOT Act. It will also substantially shape U.S. foreign policy as it 
applies to countries who do not accept the return of their own citizens. 
In addition, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in is likely to pave the way for 
new caselaw that further establishes the rights of noncitizens. Immigration 
policy has taken a one hundred and eighty degree turn from the days of 
Mezei, when the Supreme Court deemed aliens detained inside the United 
States to be effectively outside its borders with respect to constitutional 
rights. Now, individuals who have never before gained entry to the United 
States are accorded many of the same rights as legal residents. This trend 
in immigration policy is likely to continue as other circuits address the 
issue of indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens. 
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